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APPROXIMATING BEPPO LEVI’S PRINCIPIO DI APPROSSIMAZIONE
RICCARDO BRUNI AND PETER SCHUSTER
Abstract. We try to recast in modern terms a choice principle conceived by Beppo Levi,
who called it the Approximation Principle (AP). Up to now, there was almost no discussion
about Levi’s contribution, due to the quite obscure formulation of AP the author has chosen.
After briefly reviewing the historical and philosophical surroundings of Levi’s proposal, we
undertake our own attempt at interpretingAP. The idea underlying the principle, as well as the
supposed faithfulness of our version to Levi’s original intention, are then discussed. Finally,
an application of AP to a property of metric spaces is presented, with the aim of showing how
AP may work in contexts where other forms of choice are commonly at use.
§1. Introduction.
1.1. The Approximation Principle in the context of the Axiom of Choice.
In one of the best sources for the history of the Axiom of Choice (AC),
G.H. Moore’s monograph [30], several members of the “Italian school” are
acknowledged to have provided, between the end of the 19th and the begin-
ning of the 20th century, some strong criticisms against allowing arbitrary
choices in mathematics. Among those who were most involved into this cri-
tique, Moore mentions Giuseppe Peano, Rodolfo Bettazzi, and Beppo Levi.
In the present paper we focus on a principle that is characteristic of Levi’s
contribution to this debate, which has remained neglected so far.
Beppo Levi’s role in the history of AC can roughly be summarized as
follows. In 1902 Levi wrote a short note [18] inspired by Bernstein’s 1901
doctoral dissertation at Go¨ttingen [2], which contains a proof of what today
is known as the Partition Principle. Levi noticed that this argument requires
to freely choose an element from every set of any given family of sets. This
is usually regarded as one of the very first explicit references to AC in the
literature, for example by H. Rubin and J.E. Rubin [38, p. 7]:
Apparently, the first specific reference to the axiom of choice was
given in a paper by G. Peano [31]. In proving an existence theorem
for ordinary differential equations [which is now named after him],
he ran across a situation in which such a statement is needed. Beppo
Levi [18] , while discussing the statement that the union of a disjoint
set t of nonempty sets has a cardinal number greater than, or equal to
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the cardinal number of t (the Partition Principle), remarked that its
proof depended on the possibility of selecting a single member from
each element of t. It is not known whether the partition principle
implies the axiom of choice. Others, including Cantor, had used the
principle earlier, but did not mention it specifically.1
Beppo Levi’s remark rather is an observation made in the course of a proof
than an attempt to single out the underlying principle in the form of an
axiom. The note of Levi’s has nonetheless prompted the wrong belief that
he had preceded Zermelo in this respect (see, for instance, Abraham Le´vy
[27, p. 159]). On the other hand, Moore [30, p. 80], Lolli [28, p. 156], and
already Zermelo himself [49, p. 113] rightly ascribe to Levi the partition
principle only.
Later on, after AC was made explicit by Zermelo in his 1904 paper [48]
containing the proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, Levi went back to this
topic in a series of publications between 1918 and 1934. As quite a few other
mathematicians of his time, Levi was a fierce critic of Zermelo’s proposal
to use AC in mathematics. Levi even pushed his opposition as far as to
proposing a new principle, the so-called Principle of Approximation (AP),
which he intended expressis verbis as an alternative to Zermelo’s AC; this
is clear, for instance, from Levi’s 1923 letter to Hilbert [22, pp. 169–170].
Levi’s AP was then studied, also in connection with some mathematical
applications, by himself and some of his followers up to the early 1930s, but
has hardly reappeared since.
As a matter of fact, very little is known of this part of Levi’s work, both
in and outside Italy. G. Lolli’s note introducing Levi’s contributions to logic
and metamathematics [25, vol. I, pp. LXVII–LXXVI] contains some refer-
ence to AP, but is more or less limited to an historical reconstruction of the
context in which that proposal was made. Moore [30, p. 244] does refer to
Levi’s principle, and actually presents a formulation of AP, which, however,
we cannot consider as a satisfactory. An excuse for this certainly is Levi’s
cumbersome way of presenting AP, plus the fact that all his writings about
AP—including his letter to Hilbert in 1923 [22]—were written in a some-
what old-fashioned Italian (see Section 2.3 for a sample). Moore, moreover,
pays little attention to Levi’s somewhat philosophical remarks around the
formulation of AP, which actually help to gain a better understanding of it.
Presumably because of the unclear status of AP in relation to AC, Levi’s
name is missing from the name index of today’s most comprehensive list of
forms of AC by Howard and Rubin [15]. Apart from Levi’s work on the
partition principle, there is no further mention of his name by H. Rubin
and J.E. Rubin [38]. The situation is analogous for the earlier editions of the
latter monograph [36,37], and there is no talk of Levi at all by Jech [16]. One
would not even expect to find Levi’s name in Herrlich’s more mathematical
monograph [11], from which he is absent indeed.
1In this quote the obvious typographical slips were corrected, and the references were
redirected to the bibliography of the present paper.
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The main character of the historical debate on AC is metamathematical,
as we would call it today. How far metamathematical issues do have an
impact on proper mathematical ones is sometimes measured by referring
to the viewpoint of the “working mathematician”. The limitation of such a
measure is that the concept in question is bound to change historically. It is
hard to deny that Levi was, when dealing with AP, a working mathematician
of his time, though certainly one who was not indifferent to the debate on
the foundations of his discipline. And Levi was pretty clear about the impact
that he thought this issue could have on the mathematics as it was practiced
in his days [21, p. 310]:
The assumption of Zermelo’s [choice] postulate contradicts the very
nature of analysis and must thus be rejected as deprived of any sense.2
Nobody can nowadays be expected to address the issue of choice in a sim-
ilar manner. Quite on the contrary, if only vegetarianism had not become
such a common practice, one would rather accept the view according to
which, from the perspective of a (meat-eater) workingmathematician, doing
mathematics without AC looks like avoiding steaks.
Even today, however, there are areas of mathematical practice which do
recommend paying attention to what one would better (not) “eat”, mathe-
matically speaking. Where an interplay with computer science is at issue, for
example, as is the case for automated theorem proving and proof checking,
particular attention is required toward axiomatic resources (see, for instance,
[10]). This is the kind of attitude we are concerned with here, one which aims
at displaying, for the purpose of mutual comparison, the axiomatic variety
of degrees of freedom in picking elements from a given collection of mathe-
matical objects. Hence discussing Levi’s AP is an undertaking certainly not
void of implications for today’s research.
1.2. A first approximation to the ApproximationPrinciple. Due to the lack
of consideration outside the circle of Levi and his scholars, AP has arrived
to us in a form in which it cannot possibly be understood by the present-day
scholar, whomay even doubt thatLevi is describing amathematical principle
at all. This was one of our reasons for undertaking the effort to interpret
AP in modern terms. The interpretation of AP we focus on in Section 2.2 is
not easy to grasp either, but it represents a considerable step forward with
respect to the principle as originally given. In particular, we use the language
of modern mathematics, with which nowadays everyone working in formal
logic is acquainted.
We thus are able to relate our interpretation of AP with AC (Section 2.2),
and to study this relation in connection with an application of AP by Levi
himself (Section 3). In a first and rough approximation, our interpretation
of AP can be put as follows:
2Since all of Levi’s works we will make reference to are in Italian, their translation to
English is our own. Emphasis in quotations goes back to their author’s own choice, unless
specified otherwise.
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Let X,Y be sets. Assume that F ⊆ X × Y is a total relation, i.e., for
every a ∈ X there is b ∈ Y with (a, b) ∈ F . Then there is a partial
function f : X → Y , defined on those a ∈ X for which
F (a) = {b ∈ Y | (a, b) ∈ F }
is “arbitrarily approximable”, such that (a, f(a)) ∈ F for every such
a ∈ X .
No matter what “arbitrarily approximable” actually means, the principle
above can readily be recognized as a conditional form of AC, simply because
the latter asserts straightaway, for any given total relation F ⊆ X × Y , the
existence of a subfunction with the same domain X : that is, a total function
f : X → Y , i.e., one that is defined on any a ∈ X whatsoever, such that
f(a) ∈ F (a) for every a ∈ X . In other words, with AC at hand there is
no need to restrict the domain of the choice function f to those arguments
a ∈ X for which the possible range F (a) of the valuef(a), i.e., the set from
which f(a) is to be chosen, is “arbitrarily approximable”.
What, however, does “arbitrarily approximable” mean? Referring the
reader to Section 2.2 for the precise picture, we try to give a rough idea
as follows. Typically X is a family of sets; whence from now we denote the
elements of X by capital letters A,A′, A′′. Moreover, Y is endowed with a
certain notion of distance between subsets of Y : that is, a function
d : P(Y )×P(Y )→ Q+0 .
On this d Levi imposes the condition
(∗) d (Z,Z ′) = 0 ⇐⇒ Z = Z ′
for subsets Z,Z ′ of Y , which is familiar as part of the definition of a metric.
In an instance that is relevant for the mathematical application of AP we
will study eventually (Section 3), we will have Y = Q+, and
d (Z,Z ′) = sup({0} ∪ (Z 	 Z ′))
for subsets Z,Z ′ of Y where	 denotes the symmetric difference: that is,
Z 	 Z ′ = (Z ∪Z ′) \ (Z ∩ Z ′) .
For this d , clearly, the intended meaning of a “measure of difference” is met,
and (∗) is satisfied.
In general, let X be a family of sets and Y a set with a rational-valued
distance function d between subsets of Y , satisfying (∗). Given any total
relationF ⊆ X×Y andA ∈ X , following Levi wewill callF (A) “arbitrarily
approximable” if for every  > 0 there is a finite subset A0 of A such that
if A′ ∈ X and A′′ ∈ X both contain A0, then F (A′) and F (A′′) are within
 of one another: that is, more formally,
A0 ⊆ A′ ∩ A′′ =⇒ d (F (A′), F (A′′)) <  .
This is Levi’s definition as interpreted inmodern terms, no less and nomore.
The reader wondering what it actually means is in numerous company,
including ourselves when we started our work on this topic, but may now
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understand why we found it worthwhile to dig further down. We hope that
with the present paper we do justice to Levi’s proposal of AP—not only from
a historical or purely philosophical perspective, but also by highlighting
some important logical and mathematical aspects of Levi’s work on AP.
§2. The route toward Levi’s principle.
2.1. On “deductive domains”. One of the most important papers of Levi’s
on the issue of choice opens up as follows [21, p. 305]:
Any givenmathematical argument presupposes [. . . ] one ormore aggre-
gates, for each of which IT IS POSTULATED the possibility of picking
an arbitrary element, as a prime and irreducible act of thought.
This statement indeed addresses a crucial feature of what should be referred
to as Levi’s philosophical view of mathematics and its foundations. Related
ideas had already guided a lengthy note of his [19] in which he aimed
at explaining the source of logical paradoxes in mathematical reasoning
(see also [6]).
The conceptual bulk of the quote above can be summarized as fol-
lows: mathematical reasoning requires that a domain of primitive objects
be specified, to which one refers either directly, or indirectly by means of
objects which are defined in terms of the primitive ones. It is allowed then
(it is postulated, as Levi says), to pick an arbitrary element from each
aggregate belonging to the chosen domain.
Levi might have had in mind a very common aspect of mathematical
reasoning: if we want to prove a statement about a class of mathematical
objects, then an attempted proof would typically start by “Letx be any given
object of that class. . . ”. For the sake of thus picking an arbitrary element,
the class of objects must be assumed to be given as primitive, independently
from any possible way of defining some of its elements in terms of objects
outside the class.3
The logical counterpart of that situation is particularly interesting inas-
much as the issue of choice is concerned. The above kind of argumentation
can be seen as just a special case of what is known as the witnessing, or
existence property in formal axiomatics. In the simplest terms, this means
the problem, for a given formal system of axioms T and a statement ∃xϕ(x)
provable in T, i.e., T  ∃xϕ(x), to find a closed term t which, provably in T,
is a witness for this existential statement, i.e., T  ϕ(t).
3Levi speaks of the concept of real number as of a primitive concept in the above sense,
which is to be compared to the well-known fact that the collection of reals can be defined in
terms of the rationals, e.g., by means of Dedekind cuts. Levi notices that the act of taking
the collection of Dedekind cuts as a whole, or to pick an arbitrary cut from it, would remain
independent from that definition, in the sense that the reals would not be “describable by
means of operations on the natural numbers, or in any case reducible to them” ([21, p. 306]).
Hence, as far as the above situation is concerned, the collection of reals (either as such, or in
the form of Dedekind cuts) must be assumed as given.
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In particular, this is known to be a requirement for theories endorsing
a constructive approach to mathematics (the most popular examples for
these being P. Aczel’s CZF, P. Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory ITT, and J. Myhill’s
system CST).4 As a matter of fact, in the case of this group of theories, the
above problem naturally connects with the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov
interpretation of existential statements. Incidentally, Levi himself referred
to this connection, in a later paper of his [23, p. 68], trying to clarify the
meaning behind his own terminology.
Let us go back to Levi’s own words. He introduces the notion of prime
aggregate, which refers to all those collections of objects having the prop-
erty that an arbitrary element can be singled out by an independent act of
thought. In turn, aggregates of this sort give rise to a deductive domain, which
is the collection of all the prime aggregates that have to be specified prior
to performing a given mathematical argument. In a later note of his [23]
(the last one, in chronological order, among those dealing with AP), Levi
himself, as we have said above, presented deductive domains as providing an
answer to “the demand of rigor of the so-called intuitionism”. It is unclear,
and beyond the scope of the present paper, whether this sentence was made
on the basis of a proper understanding of the foundational view in ques-
tion.5 In order to justify the above connection, it seems enough, however,
to refer to the concise conclusion of the passage in question, according to
which “every existential proof is also a constructive one in a deductive domain
conveniently made precise”.
These comments have prompted the reformulation of Levi’s principle that
we are going to present next (Section 2.2). When trying to give it a modern
and readable form we have realized that there are alternative interpretations
of what Levi wrote. Hence we found it necessary to study their mutual
relationships (see Section 2.2 again), as well as to discuss their faithfulness
to Levi’s original intention (see Section 2.3).
2.2. Functions vs. relations. As we said, in this part of the section we
are going to recast Levi’s notions in modern terms, to eventually make his
principle more intelligible. Notice that in the definitions and results below
we use the time-honored term “family of sets” for a set, class, or collection
of sets.
4A systematic treatment of (special cases of) the existence property in systems for con-
structive set theory, as well as details regarding the theories we have made reference to here,
can be found in the nowadays classical book by M.J. Beeson [1]. On this topic, the reader
should also see [33, 34].
5What follows the sentence we have just quoted may lean towards the second alterna-
tive, as it seems that Levi had in mind a restricted interpretation of what intuitionism
might be like. Indeed, he speaks of it as the view according to which the only argu-
ments allowed in mathematics should be those “depending upon a finite number of ele-
ments, obtained by means of a finite number of really performable mental operations”
([23, p. 68]).
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We begin by means of the following:
Definition 2.1.
(1) A prime aggregate is an inhabited set.6
(2) For any given sets X,Y , a function from X to Y (in symbols: f :
X →Y ) assigns to every a ∈ X an element f(a) ∈ Y such that, for
any a, b ∈ X , if a = b, then f(a) = f(b).
(3) A deductive domain is a pair (E , f), where E is a family of prime
aggregates and f : E → ⋃ E is a function such that f(A) ∈ A for
every A ∈ E .
(4) For a given deductive domain (E , f), a natural extension is a deductive
domain (E ′, f′) where (i) E ⊆ E ′, and (ii) the restriction f′E of f′
to E is equal to f (that is, f′(A) = f(A) for all A ∈ E). We use
(E , f) ≤ (E ′, f′) as a shorthand for “(E ′, f′) is a natural extension of
(E , f)”.
Remark 2.2.
(i) A natural extension of a deductive domain is again a deductive
domain.
(ii) If a family of prime aggregates only consists of singletons, then it
automatically is a deductive domain.
(iii) The preceding remark extends to any family of sets, of arbitrary size,
the elements of which are well-ordered sets.
(iv) For a given a deductive domain (E , f), if E ′ = E ∪ {B} (that is, E ′
extends E by a single set), then to give a natural extension (E ′, f′) of
(E , f) is tantamount to give an element b ∈ B such that if B ∈ E ,
then b = f(B).
Although we have defined deductive domains as pairs, in the statements
of AP below we may still refer to them by means of their domain, if only for
the sake of simplicity.
The connection of these notions with AC should now turn out clearly to
the well-versed reader. Let us make it more explicit. To this end, we first
need another definition introducing the concept of many-valued function,
as opposed to the usual, single-valued one. This distinction is indeed funda-
mental for our formulation of AP, as well as for AC in one of its equivalent
presentations.
Definition 2.3. Given X,Y sets, a many-valued function F from X to
Y (for short, an MV-function; in symbols: F : X  Y ), assigns to every
a ∈ X an inhabited subset F (a) of Y .
6A set is inhabited if one can exhibit an element of it, which is the constructive interpretation
of a nonempty set.We have preferred this notion for the present paper, and understand “non-
empty” as synonymous with “inhabited”, because the latter is closer to Levi’s concept of a
prime aggregate. In view of what follows, however, one must not confuse an inhabited set
with a pair consisting of a set and a distinguished element of this set: from the latter, AC
would readily follow.
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Note that if X is inhabited and Y empty, then there is no MV-function
of type X  Y . In set-theoretic terms, an MV-function from X to Y is
nothing but a total relation: that is, a subset R of X ×Y such that for every
a ∈ X there is b ∈ Y with (a, b) ∈ R. Equivalently, any F : X  Y is a
function of type X → P(Y ), where P(Y ) denotes the power set of Y, such
that F (a) is inhabited for every a ∈ X .
Now, let us first look at the impact of this definition onAC. It is well known
that among the different, albeit equivalent, formulations of this principle,
we have the following:7
AC For all sets X,Y , and F : X  Y , there exists f : X → Y such that
f(a) ∈ F (a) for all a ∈ X .
As to the distinction between the two notions of function we have made,
there are foundational and conceptual reasons supporting the need for it. In
particular, the concept of anMV-function canbeused to encapsulate the idea
of a procedure to be performed according to a finite routine — though not
necessarily one leading to a unique output for the same choice of the input—
and would thus be the counterpart of the concept of nondeterministic algo-
rithm of what is taken, under the name of “operation”, as a primitive notion
in, e.g., E. Bishop’s approach to constructive mathematics [3, 4].8
However, the most pressing reason for proceeding this way comes from
Levi himself, who has made use of this distinction in the statement of AP.
He usually did not give details, with one notable exception: the formulation
of the principle in [21, p. 312] (see Section 2.3 below for a full quote of
this passage). There, in fact, footnote 12 reads: “To the word ‘function’ we
attach here the most general meaning”. The reference for it is Levi’s own
[20, Section III], where the above distinction (in the form of “polydrome”
vs. “monodrome” functions) is clearly made. As will turn out from looking
at our versions of AP and the subsequent results, the above form of AC
seems—at least to us—to be the most suitable one for a comparison with
Levi’s principle.
Now,we return toAP.Weproceed in a perhaps unexpectedmanner.Rather
than presenting AP through Levi’s ownwords, we offer various formulations
of AP and discuss their mutual relationships. As will turn out, this is a way
of getting closer and closer to Levi’s own phrasing of AP—as far as this is
possible. Only then (Section 2.3), we return to Levi’s AP, and discuss the
relation to our versions. So, we are basically showing the reader the way
to AP step by step, in the spirit of our paper. Nonetheless, we make some
observations along the way which might be of interest on their own, and
7Due to the remark we have just made on MV-functions, it is easy to see that this form is
easily proved to be equivalent to one formulation of AC which maybe is more familiar: For
all setsX,Y , and S ⊆ X ×Y such that for every a ∈ X , there is some y ∈ Y with (x, y) ∈ S,
there exists a function f : X → Y such that, for all a ∈ X , (a, f(a)) ∈ S. Again, if we
understood an inhabited set as a pair in the sense of footnote 6, then this form of AC would
be provable.
8The interested reader will find a detailed discussion of this topic in [39], together with
a useful consideration of how it may affect the role of choice principles in constructive
mathematics.
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may help to gradually get accustomed to Levi’s principle and its intricacies,
which we think will let the reader be in a better position to fully appreciate
it eventually.
In the following, let (E , f) be a deductive domain, Y a prime aggregate
and F : E  Y an MV-function. Let further d : P(Y )×P(Y )→ Q+0 be a
function such that d (X,X ′) = 0 if and only if X = X ′ for every X,X ′ ⊆ Y .
We write (A,F, d ) whenever A ∈ E and
(∀ > 0)(∃x1, . . . , xn ∈ A)(∀A′, A′′ ∈ E)
(x1, . . . , xn ∈ A′ ∩A′′ → d (F (A′), F (A′′)) < ),
Let further D = {A ∈ E|(A,F, d )}. Now we can formulate AP in three
different forms:
AP1 For every A ∈ E , if A ∈ D, then E ∪ {F (A)} is a natural extension
of (E , f).
AP+ E ∪ {F (A) | A ∈ D} is a natural extension of (E , f).
APC There is f∗ : D → Y such that f∗(A) ∈ F (A) for every A ∈ D,
and f∗(A) = f(F (A)) whenever F (A) ∈ E .
Clearly, the difference between AP1 and AP+ is that they allow for the
construction of an extension of the given deductive domain in two different
ways: “one by one” and “once and for ever”. Since a deductive domain
is a family of nonempty sets together with a choice function, it may seem
unnecessary to make explicit the connection with AC, but we have preferred
to do so nonetheless by giving AP also the specific choice version APC .
The last condition on f∗ in APC ensures that the functions we introduce
along the proof of Proposition 2.4 below are well defined. Such care is not
required in AP+ or AP1, owing to the fact that one hasf′  E = f, wheref′
is the choice function for the extended deductive domain both AP1 and AP+
state to exist. The assumption in question could be avoided by imposing
the extra condition on Y that P(Y ) ∩ E = ∅. Although a similar condition
seems to be presupposed in some of the formulations of AP which appear
in the literature, we have preferred not to include it in our version of AP, for
the sake of generality.
In the following, as throughout the paper, we work in ZF, possibly in a
suitable fragment.
Proposition 2.4. The three versions AP1, AP+, and APC are equivalent.
Proof. We prove:
1. AP+ ⇒ APC .
2. APC ⇒ AP1.
3. AP1 ⇒ AP+.
Let (E , f), Y, F, d and D be given as before.
1. By AP+ we have a natural extension (E ′, f′) with E ′ = E ∪ {F (A) |
A ∈ D} of the deductive domain (E , f). Let A ∈ D. Set f∗(A) =
f′(F (A)). Then, f∗(A) ∈ F (A). Further, f∗(A) = f(F (A)) if
F (A) ∈ E , since f′  E = f.
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2. Let f∗ be as in APC and assume that A ∈ D. Set E ′ = E ∪ {F (A)}.
Define f′ : E ′ → ⋃ E ′ by f′(A) = f(A) if A ∈ E , and f′(F (A)) =
f∗(A). Clearly, f′ is well defined (since if F (A) ∈ E , then f(F (A)) =
f∗(A)). Also, (E , f) ≤ (E ′, f′) as required.
3. Set E ′ = E ∪ {F (A) | A ∈ D}. Define f′ : E ′ → ⋃ E ′ by:
i. f′(A) = f(A) if A ∈ E ;
ii. f′(F (A)) = f′′(F (A)) if A ∈ D, where (E ∪ {F (A)}, f′′) is the
natural extension of (E , f) which exists by AP1.
Then, clearly (E , f) ≤ (E ′, f′). It remains to show that f′ is well defined.
Let F (A) ∈ E for some A ∈ D. By definition of f′ we have f′(F (A)) =
f′′(F (A)), and f′′  E = f yields f′′(F (A)) = f(F (A)). 
The result does not come as a surprise, except maybe for implication 3 of
the proof. Indeed, it is not at all trivial that one can define a choice function
for the whole E ∪ {F (A)|A ∈ D} out of the pieces which are given for each
E ∪ {F (A)}, whenever A ∈ D. This is made possible by the definition of
deductive domains as pairs of a family of sets and a choice function. By
doing this, if a given domain E is extended by two sets B1 and B2 which
happen to be equal, then the choice functions associated with E ∪ {B1} and
E ∪ {B2} are equal as well (as this is already made clear by Remark 1, part
(iv)). This is equivalent to having a functional which, for a given extension
E ′ of the deductive domain E , selects one choice function out of the possibly
many. In other words, the proof of AP1 ⇒ AP+ corresponds, in a general
situation, to the proof of the following lemma:
Lemma 2.5. Let E,D be sets. If f : E → ⋃E such that f(C ) ∈ C for all
C ∈ E, and
G : D → {g : E ∪ {B} →
⋃
(E ∪ {B}) | B ∈ D, g  E = f, g(B) ∈ B} ,
then there exists h : E ∪ D → ⋃(E ∪D) such that h  E = f and h(B) =
G(B)(B) for B ∈ D. In particular, h(C ) ∈ C for every C ∈ E ∪D.
The use of the distance function d stands out among the notable aspects
of AP. Our choice is to view d as yielding the distances between subsets of
the given set Y , i.e., d as a function on the Cartesian product of P(Y ) with
itself. This choice was made in view of Levi’s formulation of the condition
(A,F, d ), where the distance is taken between sets F (A) with A ∈ E ,
which in turn are subsets of Y . Levi has nonetheless defined d as acting on
points, that is on the Cartesian product of Y itself (see Section 2.3). This
possible ambiguity has leads us to some more possible interpretations of AP
in “pointwise” form, as follows.
Let (E , f) be a deductive domain, Y a prime aggregate and F : E  Y
an MV-function. Let further d˜ : Y × Y → Q+0 be such that d˜ (x, x′) = 0 if
and only if x = x′ for every x, x′ ∈ Y . We write ˜(A,F, d˜ ) whenever A ∈ E
and
(∀ > 0)(∃x1, . . . , xn ∈ A)(∀A′, A′′ ∈ E)
(x1, . . . , xn ∈ A′ ∩A′′ → d˜ (F (A′), F (A′′)) < ),
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where d˜ (F (A′), F (A′′)) <  is a shorthand for (∀y ∈ F (A′))(∀z ∈
F (A′′))(d˜ (y, z) < ). Let finally D˜ = {A ∈ E|˜(A,F, d˜ )}. As for AP
itself, we introduce the modified variant of AP in three versions:
AP1P For every A ∈ E , if A ∈ D˜, then E ∪ {F (A)} is a natural extension
of (E , f).
AP+P E ∪ {F (A) | A ∈ D˜} is a natural extension of (E , f).
APCP There exists a function f
∗ : D˜ → Y such that f∗(A) ∈ F (A) for
every A ∈ D˜, and f∗(A) = f(F (A)) if F (A) ∈ E .
Inspection of the proof of Proposition 2.4 shows that the choice of the
distance function plays no role. Hence, it is clear that, by the very same
argument, also the following holds:
Proposition 2.6. The three pointwise versions AP1P , AP
+




One interesting fact to notice is that AP in this pointwise version seems
weaker than in the original one. As a matter of fact, one can prove:
Proposition 2.7. AP1 implies AP1P .
Proof. Let (E , f), F, Y and d˜ : Y × Y → Q+0 be as in the statement of
AP1P (hence, d˜ is such that d˜ (y, y
′) = 0 iff y = y′ for every y, y′ ∈ Y ). Let
P+(Y ) be the collection of nonempty subsets of Y (that is, X ∈ P+(Y ) iff
X ⊆ Y and X = ∅).9 Define d : P(Y )×P(Y )→ Q+0 by
d (X,X ′) =
{
0, if X = X ′
sup{d˜ (x, x′) | x ∈ X, x′ ∈ X ′}, otherwise
for every X,X ′ ∈ P+(Y ). Then, d (X,X ′) = 0 if and only if X = X ′.
Observe that, for every A ∈ E , if A satisfies condition ˜(A,F, d˜ ) from
AP1P , then
(∀ > 0)(∃x1, . . . , xn ∈ A)(∀A′, A′′ ∈ E)(x1, . . . , xn ∈ A′ ∩A′′
→ d (F (A′), F (A′′)) < ) .
(This holds trivially, by definition of d , in case F (A′) = F (A′′), and follows,
in the other case and for an arbitrary  ∈ R+, by choosing those x1, . . . , xn ∈
A for which ˜(A,F, d˜ ) holds for, say, /2.) By AP1, E ∪ {F (A)} is a natural
extension of E as required by AP1P . 
Although there are ways to approach the converse direction in the case
of metric functions, that is to define a pointwise metric starting from one
between sets of elements, no one of them seems suitable in order to fulfil
Levi’s more strict requirement on d to be such that d (X,X ′) = 0 iffX = X ′.
This makes it likely that no reverse implication can be proved directly. As
we shall see, however, an equivalence between AP in its pointwise and non-
pointwise versions is possible in the general case through AC. In order to
show this, we first need to point out some general observations regarding
AP.
9Remember that the distance function d we are seeking for, needs to be defined on sets
F (A) for A ∈ E which are nonempty subsets of Y .
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Let in the following P1(Z) = {{z} : z ∈ Z} denote the set of singleton
subsets of Z, for any given set Z.
Lemma 2.8.
(a) If E = P1(Z), then (A,F, d ) and ˜(A,F, d˜ ) hold automatically for
every A ∈ E , and independently of the choice of F , d and d˜ .
(b) If (A,F, d ) holds and A′, A′′ ∈ E are such that A ⊆ A′ ∩ A′′, then
F (A′) = F (A′′).
(c) If (A,F, d ) holds and B ∈ E is such thatA ⊆ B , then F (A) = F (B).
(d) Let E be a family of sets which is inhabited and totally ordered by ⊆.
Let A0 be the least element of E . If (A0, F, d ), then (A,F, d ) for
every A ∈ E .
Proof.
(a) Let, for some given set Z, E = P1(Z) be the case. Let Y,F, d be as
in the statement of AP1. Now, for every A ∈ E on has A = {a} for
some a ∈ Z. Hence, given A ∈ E with A = {a}, for every A′, A′′ ∈ E
one has a ∈ A′ ∩ A′′ if and only if A = A′ = A′′. This entails
F (A′) = F (A′′), that is d (F (A′), F (A′′)) = 0 <  for every  ∈ R+.
One reasons in a similar manner for ˜(A,F, d˜ ).
(b) It suffices to show that d (F (A′), F (A′′)) = 0, that is,
d (F (A′), F (A′′)) <  for every  ∈ R+. Let  > 0, pickx1, . . . , xn ∈ A
as in (A,F, d ). Since A ⊆ A′ ∩A′′, we have x1, . . . , xn ∈ A′ ∩A′′ in
particular, and then d (F (A′), F (A′′)) <  by (A,F, d ) itself.
(c) Follows from (b), with A′ = A and A′′ = B .
(d) An immediate consequence of (b). 
It is important to notice that only part (a) of this lemma extends to
˜(A,F, d˜ ). This has to do with the different choice of the distance func-
tion. As a matter of fact, if d˜ is as in the statement of AP1P , it is in general
possible that d˜ (X,X ′) > 0 even if X = X ′, for X,X ′ ⊆ Y . By part (a) of
Lemma 2.8 one nonetheless proves the following:
Proposition 2.9.
1. APCP implies AC.
2. AC implies APC .
Proof.
1. Let X,Y, F be as in the statement of AC. Set E = P1(X ) and f : E →⋃ E be defined by f({a}) = a for every a ∈ X . Set F ′ : E  Y
by F ′({a}) = F (a), for every a ∈ X . Let d˜ : Y × Y → Q+0 be any
function satisfying d˜ (z, z ′) = 0 if, and only if z = z ′, for every z, z ′ ∈ Y
(one can, e.g., define d˜ by d˜ (z, z ′) = 0 if z = z ′, and d˜ (z, z ′) = 1
otherwise, for every z, z ′ ∈ Y ). By Lemma 2.8, part (a) and APCP
one has that there exists a function f′ : E → Y such that f′({a}) ∈
F ′({a}) = F (a) for every a ∈ X . Define f : X → Y by f(a) =
f′({a}) for every a ∈ X .
2. Let (E , f), F, d , and D as in the statement of APC . By AC, there exists
a function g : E → Y such that g(A) ∈ F (A) for every A ∈ E .
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Define f∗ : D → Y by
f∗(A) =
{
f(F (A)), if F (A) ∈ E
g(A), otherwise
for every A ∈ D. 
By Propositions 2.4, 2.6 and 2.7 we have:
Corollary 2.10.
1. AP∗(P) and AC are equivalent, for ∗ ∈ {1,+, C}.
2. AP∗ is equivalent to AP∗P , for ∗ ∈ {1,+C}.
Since Levi was criticizing AC, this last result would allow one to say that
the possibility of taking deductive domains made out of singletons trivi-
alizes AP, or even betrays the spirit of Levi’s proposal entirely. Vice versa,
one notices that the usage of AP is nontrivial (or, nontrivially equivalent to
AC) whenever it is applied to deductive domains which contain at least one
set consisting of two or more elements. In particular, this holds whenever
a deductive domain contains at least one infinite set. As it will turn out
more clearly from Section 2.3, it is likely that Levi was inclined to accept
only those deductive domains whose elements are infinite sets. For the sake
of the issue of choice, relativizations of AP to deductive domains in this
form are particularly interesting, as allowing choice over families of infi-
nite sets is most problematic. By elaborating on a remark by Levi himself
[21, pp. 323–324], one obtains a very interesting reduction to the countable
case for AP applied to deductive domains which contain infinite sets.
Let APC(P)(N) stay for AP applied to a deductive domain which contains
only countable sets. For the sake of the foregoing result, as well as for later
on in the section, we would like to remark that a proof of the fact that a
countable union of finite sets is countable is already possible in ZF alone,
hence it does not require ACN. On the contrary, the generalization of it to the
countable union of countable sets is known to require ACN (see, e.g., [17]).
Then we have:
Proposition 2.11. The axiomof countable choiceACN proves thatAPC (N)
implies APC .
Proof. Let (E , f), F, Y, d andD as in the statement ofAPC . Fix a descend-
ing sequence of positive rational numbers (ri )i∈N such that limi→∞ ri = 0
(for example, rn = 2−n). Let A ∈ D. Then, fix, for every i ∈ N,
ai1, . . . , aini ∈ A such that, if A′, A′′ ∈ E and ai1, . . . , aini ∈ A′ ∩ A′′, then
d (F (A′), F (A′′)) < ri (notice that this requires ACN).
LetCA be the union of the countable family of the finite sets {ai1, . . . , aini},
with i ∈ N. Notice that CA is countable. It follows that if A′ ∈ E is such
that CA ⊆ A′, we have d (F (A′), F (A)) < ri for every i ∈ N, that is,
d (F (A′), F (A)) = 0. Hence, F (A) = F (A′).
Set E ′ = {CA|A ∈ D}. Now, every finite set {ai1, . . . , aini} has an element
carrying the lowest index for every i ∈ N. More than that, every set CA has
an element carrying the lowest index, being it the union of all of these finite
154 RICCARDO BRUNI AND PETER SCHUSTER
sets. Call it a .10 Set f′(CA) = a . Then, (E ′, f′) is a deductive domain.
Moreover, we are entitled to apply APC (N) since E ′ contains only countable
sets. Then, there exists a function f′′ : E ′ → Y such that f′′(CA) ∈ F (CA),
where F (CA) = F (A) by the preceding argument.
Define f∗ : E → Y by f∗(A) = f′′(CA). 
Notice that Proposition 2.11 does not give any clue concerning the rela-
tionship between ACN and AP. In particular, it does not allow to build
an argument showing that the latter is implied by the former. Incidentally,
the impression that such a result may hold seems legitimated by parts of the
literature dealing with AP. Viola, for instance, seems to be suggesting this
in [44, p. 289]. Moore [30, p. 80, 244] is even more explicit, and speaks of
AP as being a principle that is a weak form of ACN. He gives no proof, and
presumably is referring to Levi’s own remark in this respect. It should be
made clear, however, that what we have just said does not suffice to conclude
anything of that sort, for we have no information about the size of the set
{CA | A ∈ D} which may well exceed the power of ACN to produce a choice
function.
Levi was quite sober in this respect, and declared that AP is “determined”
by always countably many choices. He thought this could be important for
the general appreciation of AP owing to an “unconscious tendency” ofmany
a mathematician to “consent infinitely–many arbitrary choices, in case they
are denumerably many”. As a matter of fact, the result is quite notable: for,
it shows that the approximation principle restricted to a deductive domain E
which contains a countable set yields a choice function for any domain con-
taining arbitrary supersets of the elements of E . This is something peculiar
to AP, and is hardly conceivable for the usual choice principles.
Let us now leave these remarks behind, and summarize this section instead.
We have here presented two different interpretations of Levi’s AP. On the
one hand, by noticing that Levi defined the distance function d as applying
to sets F (A) (A ∈ D), we have viewed d as defined on subsets of the given
set Y . On the other, we have retained d to be defined on points (that is,
elements of Y ) as Levi did, and showed how to modify the approximation
condition instead. This gives rise toAP in its pointwise versionsAP∗P . In both
cases, we obtained three forms of AP, and showed that they are equivalent
(over ZF). However, both versions of the principle turned out to be fairly
strong if applied to the general definition of deductive domain, forwhich they
are equivalent to AC. This suggests to take into account Levi’s remark that
deductive domains should include infinite sets. In every case, Proposition
2.11 shows that AP in its countable form AP(N) is enough to ensure the full
strength of its general form.
In the end, we do have a reasonable version AP∗P(N) of Levi’s principle
to work with. In order to let the reader reconcile all the passages we have
hinted at with Levi’s actual statement of AP, we first reproduce and discuss
the latter before testing AP in the mathematical setting.
10Notice that  has always the form 01, since every set {ai1, ..., aini } is nonempty.
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2.3. Some historical remarks. Since the versions of AP we presented
before are the result of our own interpretation of Levi’s wordings of AP,
we owe a couple of comments to those who aim at being faithful to prime
sources. One might even think that we should instead have proceeded the
other way round, starting from Levi’s way to put AP. We are convinced,
however, that this would rather have confused the reader than being of
any help, and hope that the reader will agree with us after reading Levi’s
formulation of AP as reproduced below. For this we stick to the source
[21, pp. 312–313], which is the one we have already referred to.11
Approximation principle. Let a deductive domain Ω be given, in
which the collection of real numbers (or the set of rational numbers
at least) be a prime aggregate; let A,B,C,. . . be sets defined in Ω and
contained as subsets in prime aggregates ofΩ (such that we are entitled
to consider arbitrary elements of them). Let E be a set which is a
prime aggregate not contained in the deductive domain Ω instead, the
elements of which could be regarded as containing infinite elements
arbitrarily chosen from the aggregates A,B,C,. . . (possibly, only from
some of them): let a function f(x)12 be given, with respect to which the
domain D of x be contained in E, while the corresponding domain F
of the function be contained in a setG, which is either prime aggregate
or not, and either belongs to Ω or not; finally let a numerical function
d(y,z) be defined on pairs of elements of G, which be null always and
only when y=z; let us suppose that a is an element of D such that, given
an arbitrary number , among the elements of A,B,C,. . . constituting
a, it is possible to fix a finite number n of them such that, for any two
elements a′,a′′ of D having in common with a the said n elements, it is
always d(f(a′),f(a′′))< .
Then, we consider the statement “f(a) exists” as belonging to the
natural extension of the deductive domain Ω.
12To the word “function” we assign here the most general meaning (see my
Introduction to mathematical analysis, vol. I, Section III, Parma, 1916).
Our presentation of Levi’s principle looks prima facie quite different from
Levi’s own formulation. For, given a deductive domain Ω, Levi speaks of a
collection of infinite sets E the elements of which are “chosen” among the
elements of the sets inΩ, and further restricts the domain of theMV-function
f to a subset D of this E. In other formulations of his principle [23, p. 72],
the elements of D are said to “correspond” to infinite elements of
⋃
Ω, this
correspondence being identified with the “simultaneous conception of these
infinite elements, sometimes with ‘assigning a name’ to their collection”.
Since the principle is complicated already, we thought it inappropri-
ate to follow Levi’s formulation word by word. So, we have set Ω = E
(and renamed it E , at the same time) for the sake of simplicity, the extension
of the principle to Levi’s general case being recoverable from that. In our
opinion, this is further justified by the fact that the principle appears as a way
11Small capital letters and emphasis are already in the source [21].
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to pass from the originally given deductive domain Ω to a natural extension
of it. In this respect, our definition of “natural extension” of a given deduc-
tive domain, made out of Levi’s remark that “f(a) exists” be part of this
concept, corresponds to Levi’s conviction that the act of picking elements
from a given collection of mathematical objects is an essential aspect of the
existence of that collection.
We would like to emphasize what we have already referred to as Levi’s
quite involved way of writing. This is made worse here by what seems to be
a lack of sensibility on his behalf. For instance, he decided to use the word
“chosen” in the preamble of what should be a choice principle, to express
the fact that E is defined out of the given elements of the deductive domain
(which can be stated in simple terms by E ⊆ ⋃Ω). This certainly explains
Moore’s interpretation of AP [30, p. 244], which we consequently regard as
a little inadequate.
This said, the rest of the principle is easier to reconcile to what we have
said above. When introducing the function f, one notices the footnote with
which Levi refers the reader to his introduction to analysis. This source
contains a distinction between “monodrome”, or single-valued functions,
and “polydrome”, or many–valued ones (the latter being clearly the “most
general” meaning of the word that Levi mentions).
Furthermore, notice that Levi’s distance function d is actually defined on
points, that is, elements of the codomain F off, which in Levi’s terminology
is the “domain” over which the expressionf(x) varies (note that this and the
next occurrence of F mean Levi’s F , which is Y in our variants of AP). We
thus have also considered the pointwise versions AP∗P . On the other hand,
the decision to initially provide the versions AP∗ of APwasmotivated by the
fact that, in the course of explaining what we have called the approximation
condition, Levi speaks of d as applying to values of the function f, which,
due to the preceding remark, are subsets of (Levi’s) F . Since Levi gives no
clue as to how one should interpret this, we thought it beneficial to explore
two natural ways of explaining what he might have meant, by studying the
conditions (A,F, d ) and ˜(A,F, d˜ ) from Section 2.2.
Finally, it should now be clear that Levi thought of AP as applying to
sets containing infinite sets, since the counterpart of a deductive domain E
as this concept occurs in our formulation of AP is the set E, which Levi
defines as a family of infinite sets containing elements “chosen” from sets
belonging to the deductive domain Ω. This was the reason for considering
the reduction of AP to the countable case AP∗P(N).
Needless to say, other interpretations of the principle are possible. In
particular, one could think of ways to relax the condition ˜(A,F, d˜ ) even
further. This is why we now turn to study an application of AP that was
proposedbyLevi himself.We consider the fact thatwe canmake it intelligible
to be an essential support for the claim that our versions of AP embody the
mathematical content of Levi’s.
§3. AP at work: a case study. Levi’s own papers, especially [21, 22],
contain a discussion of AP together with samples of applications. Other
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mathematicians coming from the Italian school got involved in this project
of testing AP around the early and mid 1930’s. Levi’s student T. Viola in
particular [26,44,45,46], andG. Scorza–Dragoni [41,42] (the latter contribu-
tion being the last ever, chronologically speaking), took part in this project.
Further references to Levi’s principle can be found, as reported by Moore
[30, p. 246], in a few other works byU. Cassina [8] andA. Faedo [9], without,
however, any further study of AP. “Outside Italy”, asMoore [30, p. 246] puts
it, “the Principle of Approximation generated no interest at all”. This means
in particular that Levi’s attempt [22] to attract Hilbert’s attention to his own
proposal, as well as Levi’s efforts to convince Hilbert that the spirit of AP
could be seen to agree with the bulk of Hilbert’s program for the foundations
of mathematics [12, 13], presumably turned out to be a failure. This cannot
be said for sure, however, since there is no trace of Hilbert replying to Levi’s
letter.12
For the sake of illustrating how the principle works, as well as of con-
tributing a little bit to the range of applications and critical evaluations of it,
we have selected an example from the above literature. The example we have
chosen clearly reflects the authors’ taste and expertise, but in our opinion is
also among the most interesting invocations of AP.
The example in question, which Levi has discussed in [21, pp. 318–320],
concerns a property of metric spaces E. Borel has dealt with before
[5, p. 12–13] in what seems to be the attempt of carrying over to open
sets something like the property for closed sets reflected by the theorem
named after H.E. Heine and Borel himself. Having been unable to find a
name for this property in the literature, we have decided to baptize it as in
part (ii) of Definition 3.1 below,13
Throughout we are using the standard notation for open balls
Br(a) = {x ∈ X | dX (a, x) < r}
with center a ∈ A, forA subset of ametric space (X, dX ), and radius r ∈ Q+.
Definition 3.1.
(i) In a metric space (X, dX ), a subset A ⊆ X is open if for every a ∈ A
there exists ra > 0 such that Bra (a) ⊆ A.
(ii) Anopen subsetAofX is countably coverable, if there exists a countable





12V.M. Abrusci [14, p. 32] states that Hilbert had, among others, Levi’s viewpoint in mind,
when arguing against some approaches to the foundations. However, no further mention of
Levi can be found in C. Reid’s biography of Hilbert [35], to which Abrusci refers for further
information.
13The property is reminiscent of the Lindelo¨f Covering Lemma. Among the scholars
working onAP,Viola [7, p. 46] explicitly relatedLevi’s remark toLindelo¨f ’s U¨berdeckungssatz
part (i) of which is a variant of standard terminology. However, the reader should notice
that the property is here made specific to covers of a certain form (that is, consisting of open
balls).
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It should be clear that the property of being countably coverable does not
trivialize in the case of a bounded set, since the property requires a family of
balls that covers the set precisely: that is, does not include any space outside
the given set. Note that in computable analysis [47] an open subset of a
(separable) metric space is just defined as a countable union of open balls.
The reader may also notice that in part (i) of this definition, we have, by
assigning a to ra following Borel [5], tacitly invoked AC. Part (ii) of Defini-
tion 3.1 is instead the natural consequence of such a definition of openness.
By forming pairs of centers and radii, or, equivalently, by considering balls
as a whole, it is of course possible to hide any reference to AC. In fact, one
can equivalently define “A is countably coverable” in the following manner:
there exists a countable set F consisting of open balls such that A = ⋃F .
Incidentally, the latter is Borel’s very definition in [5], apart from the fact
that he uses symbols only for the open set A and its points a. Therefore, his
definition of “A is countably coverable” is not in complete accordance with
his definition of openness, which is part (i) of Definition 3.1 above. Let us
stress once more that the property Definition 3.1 refers to does not coincide
with the generic property of having a covering for a subset in metric space,
since here we are seeking for sets with a certain size, and made out of sets of
a given form.
Borel’s original theorem is about the special case X = R2, though it
can be generalized to the case X = Rn. We now modify the argument by
Borel to encapsulate an observation by Levi, which makes it easier to verify
Theorem 3.4 below when AP is at use. For convenience, we divide the proof
of Theorem 3.3 into its components, to make it clear which assumptions the
argument rests upon. One first needs the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 (E. Borel 1917, B. Levi 1918). Let A be an open and bounded
subset of R2. Fix r∗ > 0, and let A∗ = {a ∈ A | Br∗(a) ⊆ A}.
1. There exists a finite sequence a1, . . . , an ∈ A∗ such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,




Bri (ai ) ⊆ A, (1)
2. In part 1 one can achieve that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if i = j,
then
ai ∈ Brj (aj) ∧ aj ∈ Bri (ai ) .
Part 2 of Lemma 3.2 means that any two balls of the finite cover of A∗ are
“distant enough”, or, more literally, that their centers are such that either
lies outside the other ball.
Proof.
1. Since A is bounded, A∗ is bounded as well. We may assume A∗ to be
bounded by a square S = [R,−R]2. The proof is by contradiction.
Hence, the property (1) must fail to hold, in particular, for the inter-
section ofA∗ with at least one of the subsquares S1, . . . , S4 of S, whose
edges have length R/2 and which are as in the picture below:





Now, by continuing the process of halving the edges, one can build
a sequence of squares (Si)i∈N such that Si ∩ A∗ = ∅ and (1) fails
(with Si ∩A∗ in place of A∗), for every i ∈ N. In particular, among the
elements of that sequence, one can find a square Sj , for some j ∈ N,
with diagonal d < r∗. Letp ∈ Sj∩A∗. Then, one hasSj ⊆ Br∗(p) ⊆ A
in contradiction to the assumption.
2. Letai , aj ∈ A∗ be among the elements of the finite sequence of elements
of A obtained by 1, with i = j. If, for instance, ai ∈ Brj (aj) is the
case (the argument for the other case being obviously symmetric), we
remove Bri (ai ) from the cover and replace Brj (aj) by Bri+rj (aj) which
covers both Bri (ai ) and Brj (aj). 
This proof, and the one of the next result, is carried out along the lines
of Borel [5, pp. 12–13]. It has been rewritten here including Levi’s remark
[21, p. 318] as part 2.
Theorem 3.3 (Borel 1917). ACN proves that every open and bounded subset
of R2 is countably coverable.
Proof. LetA ⊆ R2 be an open, bounded set. Take a descending sequence
of positive rationals (rn)n∈N such that limn→∞ rn = 0. For every n ∈ N set
An = {a ∈ A | Brn(a) ⊆ A} ,
and note that A =
⋃
n∈NAn. For every n ∈ N choose a finite cover Cn of
An as in Lemma 3.2, part 1 such that Cn consists of open balls with rational
radii ≥ rn and centers in An, and
⋃
Cn ⊆ An. Note that this move requires









and thus A =
⋃F where F = ⋃n∈NCn. 
Levi [21, p. 320] remarks that the proof above still depends upon “infinitely
many arbitrary choices”, and looks for a “more deterministic” version of it
which could make precise the law according to which one assigns the points
of any open subset A of the given space to the corresponding balls. Notably,
he leaves unnoticed that Borel’s proof requires ACN. He thus acts differently
from how one may expect, metamathematically speaking. In particular, he
does not seek a proof showing that ACN can be dispensed with, in favor of
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AP alone. This is probably related to the “unconscious tendency” of mathe-
maticians we referred to at the end of Section 2.2, to believe that one could
make it legitimate to perform countably many choices. Instead, Levi shows
how, by means of AP and ACN, one can actually address what bothered him
about Borel’s argument: that is, how to find a function assigning points to
balls in such a way that Borel’s proof of Theorem 3.3 would go through.
This is why the theorem below, which we ascribe to Levi, is just the same as
Theorem 3.3 except for the additional hypothesis concerning AP. The latter
makes Borel’s original proof “more deterministic” in the sense we have just
explained, as we shall notice again at the end of the argument.
Theorem 3.4 (Levi 1918). APCP (N) and ACN prove that every open and
bounded subset of R2 is countably coverable.
Proof. Assume that A is an open and bounded subset of R2. Let (rn)n∈N
be a descending sequence of positive rational numbers with limn→∞ rn = 0.
For every n ∈ N set again
An = {a ∈ A | Brn(a) ⊆ A} ,
for which A =
⋃
n∈NAn. By Lemma 3.2 and ACN we can choose, for every
n ∈ N, a finite set Cn ⊆ A of centers and a finite set Rn ⊆ Q+ of radii such




Br(c)(c) ⊆ A .
For every Z ⊆ A we consider the following properties of any given
Y ⊆ Q+:
(A) For every r ∈ Y there exists c ∈ Z such that Br(c) ⊆ A.
(B) If Cn ⊆ Z for some n ∈ N, then Rn ⊆ Y .
(C) For every r, r′ ∈ Y and c, c′ ∈ Z, if c = c′ ∨ r = r′, then
Br(c) ∪ Br′(c′) ⊆ A→ c ∈ Br′(c′) ∧ c′ ∈ Br(c) .
Now set, as Levi [21, p. 320] suggests, E = Pℵ0(A), where Pℵ0(A) is the
set of countable subsets of A. By Lemma 3.2 we know that we can define
an MV-function F : E  P(Q+) such that, for every Z ∈ E , Y ∈ F (Z) if
and only if Y ⊆ Q+, and (A)+(B)+(C) hold for Y . In particular, notice
that condition (C) above comes from Levi’s own remark on Borel’s original
proof.
Let d˜ : P(Q+) × P(Q+) → Q+0 be defined by setting, for every Y,Y ′ ∈
P(Q+),
d˜ (Y,Y ′) = sup({0} ∪ (Y 	 Y ′))
where again Y 	 Y ′ = (Y ∪ Y ′) \ (Y ∩ Y ′). Clearly, d˜ (Y,Y ′) = 0 if and
only if Y = Y ′.
Set Z =
⋃{Cn|n ∈ N}; notice that Z ∈ E . In fact, the following works
for every Z ∈ E such that ⋃Cn ⊆ Z. Let  > 0. Pick k ∈ N such that
APPROXIMATING BEPPO LEVI’S PRINCIPIO DI APPROSSIMAZIONE 161
rk < . Let Z ′, Z ′′ ∈ E such that Ck ⊆ Z ′ ∩ Z ′′, and let Y ′ ∈ F (Z ′) and
Y ′′ ∈ F (Z ′′). By condition (B) we have Rk ⊆ Y ′ ∩ Y ′′.
Moreover, one can show that
∀r ∈ Y ′ 	 Y ′′(r < rk). (2)
In view of our choice of k, this would suffice to conclude that d˜ (Y ′, Y ′′) < 
for all Y ′ ∈ F (Z ′) and Y ′′ ∈ F (Z ′′). In turn, this makes condition
˜(Z,F, d˜ ) satisfied.
To prove (2) we show that if r ∈ Y ′ and r ≥ rk , then r ∈ Y ′′ (the other
case can be treated symmetrically). Let r ∈ Y ′. Then, by condition (A),
there exists c ∈ Z ′ such that Br(c) ⊆ A. In particular, if r ≥ rk , then
c ∈ Ak . Hence,




where, recalling the notation we have introduced at the beginning of this
proof, r(e) ∈ Rk , for every e ∈ Ck. This means that, for some e ∈ Ck , we
have c ∈ Br(e)(e). Since, as we have noticed,Rk ⊆ Y ′∩Y ′′ by (B), condition
(C) applied to r′ = r(e) and c′ = e yields in particular that r = r(e) ∈ Y ′′.
Hence (2).
As we have noticed, this entails ˜(Z,F, d˜ ) for all Z ∈ E such that⋃{Cn|n ∈ N} ⊆ Z. Let D be the collection of those Z’s (that is, Z ∈ D iff
Z ∈ E and ⋃{Cn|n ∈ N} ⊆ Z). Then, by APCP (N), there exists a function
f∗ such that f∗(Z) ∈ F (Z) for every Z ∈ D. Now, for any such f∗, one
has
⋃{Rn|n ∈ N} ⊆ f∗(Z) in view of (B). In fact, the argument we have
used in order to prove (2) shows that f∗(Z) =
⋃{Rn|n ∈ N}.










Note that r(c) ∈ f∗(Z) for every c ∈ Cn ⊆ Z. 
It should be clear that AP helps to make the proof of Borel “more deter-
ministic” inasmuch as it now contains a law, the function f∗, which assigns
the elements of the given open set to the desired balls. In turn, this reduces
the impact of the implicit reference to AC in the definition of openness Levi
and Borel started from.
For the sake of the preceding argument, it should be observed that d˜ is the
pointwise distance function on the codomain of the MV-function F (which,
incidentally, is the power set of the set of the positive rationals). This should
be compared with the definition of a non-pointwise metric d , as we will do
it for the sake of proving Proposition 3.10 below.
In contemporary mathematics one would presumably proceed in a differ-
ent manner. One would rather accept the very definition of openness Levi
seems to be troubled with, as well as the definition of “A is countably cover-
able”, for any open subset A of a given metric space (X, dX ), by diminishing
the appeal to AC as we indicated after Definition 3.1. Then, one would
observe that the property that Theorem 3.3 deals with can be generalized as
follows. Recall first the following notions:
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Definition 3.5.
(1) A subset S of a metric space (X, dX ) is dense if for every a ∈ X , and
for every ε > 0, there exists s ∈ S such that dX (a, s) < ε.
(2) A metric space (X, dX ) is separable if there exists a countable S ⊆ X
which is dense in (X, dX ).
For instance, Rn is separable because Qn is dense in it. The general result
we have in mind reads as follows:
Theorem 3.6. In a separable metric space (X, dX ), every open subset A of
X is countably coverable.
Although this result is somewhat trivial, it is hard if not impossible to find
it in textbooks. In order to detect where one needs AC, we next prove it in
all details.14
A classical proof of Theorem 3.6 would indeed make use of ACN, albeit
only for the sake of proving Lemma 3.9 below, which states that openness
alone suffices to obtain the result, whereas ACN remains unused for Propo-
sition 3.8 below, which generalizes Borel’s Theorem 3.3 to separable metric
spaces. Moreover, the argument for the latter is based on assigning elements
of an open set to radii—according to a rule, as desired by Levi, but without
any appeal to AP.
We first prove the following little lemma from metric topology:
Lemma 3.7. In a metric space (X, dX ), and for every open subsetA ofX :
(i) if S ⊆ X is dense in (X, dX ), then SA = S ∩A is dense in A;
(ii) if A is bounded, a ∈ A, and
r(a) = sup{r > 0 | Br(a) ⊆ A},
then Br(a)(a) ⊆ A.
Proof.
(i) Let (X, dX ) be a metric space with S ⊆ X dense in X . Now, by the
openness of A, for all a ∈ A there exists r > 0 such that Br(a) ⊆ A.
By S being dense in (X, dX ), for every ε ≤ r there exists s ∈ S such
that dX (a, s) < ε. In particular, s ∈ A.
(ii) Let A and r(a) be as in the hypothesis. The definition of r(a) is
legitimate since, by A being bounded, the set Ra = {r > 0 | Br(a) ⊆
A}has anupper bound, andbyAbeing open,Ra is nonempty.Now let
b ∈ Br(a)(a). This means that ε = dX (a, b) < r(a). By definition of
the r(·) function, there exists r < r(a) such that ε < r andBr(a) ⊆ A.
This implies b ∈ Br(a) ⊆ A as desired. 
The preceding lemma yields the following main step towards Theorem
3.6:
Proposition 3.8. Let (X, dX ) be a separable metric space. Then, if A ⊆ X
is open and bounded, A is countably coverable.
14Note that Theorem 3.6 is equivalent, over a fragment of CZF, to the Kripke Schema in
the form “Every subset of N is countable”. See [29] and [40] for details.
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Proof. IfA is as in the hypothesis, S is a countable and dense subset ofX ,
and SA and r(a) for a ∈ A are as in Lemma 3.7, then it suffices to observe
that A ⊆ ⋃s∈SA Br(s)(s), for then actually A = ⋃s∈SA Br(s)(s) in view of
Lemma 3.7, part (ii).
To see this, take a ∈ A, and r > 0 such that B2r(a) ⊆ A. For example,
one can set 2r = r(a). Then, take s ∈ SA such that s ∈ Br(a), which
entails Br(s) ⊆ B2r(a) ⊆ A. By definition, it follows that r ≤ r(s) and
a ∈ Br(s) ⊆ Br(s)(s). 
Note that r(a) is defined rather than chosen; whence no use at all of AC
is required.15
Then, as it was said, one further needs the following result in order to
obtain Theorem 3.6 above:
Lemma 3.9. ACN proves that in a metric space (X, dx), if for every A ⊆ X
“A open and bounded” implies that A is countably coverable, then for every
A ⊆ X “A open” implies that A is countably coverable.
Proof. LetA ⊆ X be open. Take a ∈ X to be arbitrary but fixed. Define,
for every n ∈ N,
An = A ∩ Bn(a).
Then, each of these sets An is an open and bounded subset of X . By
hypothesis, for every n ∈ N there exists a countable family Cn of open
balls whose union equals An. Note that this move requires ACN. Set F :=⋃











which ends the proof. 
With Proposition 3.8 and Lemma 3.9 we have proved Theorem 3.6 too.
We finally observe that one also can—by precisely making use of the trick
we have used to prove Proposition 2.9—prove Proposition 3.8 by means of
AP. So, the following proposition is the same as Proposition 3.8, except for
the additional hypothesis of AP.
Proposition 3.10. APC proves that every open and bounded subset of a
separable metric space (X, dX ) is countably coverable.
Proof. Let A ⊆ X be open and bounded, S ⊆ X countable and dense,
and SA as in Lemma 3.7, part (i). Since A is open and SA is dense in A,
we can define an MV-function F : SA  Q+ such that, for every s ∈ SA,
t ∈ F (s) if and only if Bt(s) ⊆ A and P(s, t) holds, where the latter is
defined by





Here r(a) is as in Lemma 3.7, part (ii). Now, F is well defined by choosing,
e.g., t = r(s): in fact, Br(s)(s) ⊆ A by Lemma 3.7, part (i) since s ∈ SA ⊆ A;
15To have that SA is countable as a subset of the countable setS, one needsKripke’s schema
– see footnote 14.
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and P(s, r(s)) holds because if a ∈ A, then Br(a)(a) ⊆ A again by Lemma
3.7, part (i). Hence if s ∈ Br(a)/2(a), then Br(a)/2(s) ⊆ Br(a)(a) ⊆ A: that is,
r(a)/2 ≤ r(s) as required.
Note that F (s) is a bounded subset of Q+ for every s ∈ SA, because A is
bounded.
Now we can use the “singleton trick” we have used in the proof of Propo-
sition 2.9. So, set E = P1(SA), which, we recall, is the set of singletons of
elements of SA. Let F1 : E  Q+ be defined by F1({s}) = F (s) for every
s ∈ SA, and let d : P(Q+)×P(Q+)→ Q+0 be given by, for everyR,R′ ⊆ Q+,
d (R,R′) = sup({0} ∪ (R	R′)),
where again R 	 R′ = (R ∪ R′) \ (R ∩ R′). Now, as noticed before,
d (R,R′) = 0 if and only if R = R′. Furthermore, by Lemma 2.8, part (a)
the precondition (Z,F1, d ) of AP
C holds for every Z ∈ E . Hence by APC
there exists a function f1 : E → Q+ such that f1({s}) ∈ F1({s}) = F (s),
for every s ∈ SA. Now define f∗ : SA → Q+ by setting f∗(s) = f1({s}) for
every s ∈ SA, and let C = {Bf∗(s)(s) | s ∈ SA}. Since SA is countable, C is





C ⊆ A, for f∗(s) ∈ F (s) for every s ∈ SA. As for the converse,
A ⊆ ⋃C , leta ∈ A. Let 2r = r(a). SinceSA is dense inA, there exists s ∈ SA
such that s ∈ Br(a), i.e., a ∈ Br(s). Also, r ≤ f∗(s) for f∗(s) ∈ F (s) and
P(s, f∗(s)) holds. In all, a ∈ Br(s) ⊆ Bf∗(s)(s). 
Now, besides involving AP in its non-pointwise form, the foundational
interest of this result is limited. For, we have here made use of a choice
principle (AP) while we have seen before that no principle of this sort is
needed (Proposition 3.8). By the way, the form APC of AP we have assumed
in Proposition 3.10 implies ACN (in fact it applies AC, see Proposition 2.9,
part 1), which in turn is needed to obtain the more refined result Theorem
3.6. All this naturally prompts the remarks that we make next, which we
hold for important for any further study of AP.
§4. Final comments, and further work. It turns out quite clearly that the
issue we have been concerned with has a philosophical as well as a more
technical facet. Let us focus first on the philosophical aspect. According to
Levi’s viewofmathematics, the act of picking elements fromgiven collections
of objects is to be regarded as a primitive operation. However, Levi’s critique
of Zermelo’s axiom requires that this very operation must be restricted by
certain conditions.16 Now AP is intended to balance between these two
requests of Levi’s. Clearly, it would be important to classify the strength of
AP in order to be in a position to evaluate such an equilibrium properly. The
problem of finding connections of AP with the usual principles of choice is
in fact most pressing.
16It should be observed that Levi’s criticism of Zermelo’s principle is motivated somewhat
indirectly, as it depends upon the well-known equivalence between AC and the well-ordering
principle. It is this latter result which Levi thought to be totally unjustified, as it turns
out to be based on an ad hoc enlargement of an originally chosen deductive domain
(see [21, pp. 309–312], [22, pp. 168–169], and [23, pp. 69–70]).
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However, this is not the only issue. Something else turns out from reflecting
on the specific features of Levi’s principle. First of all, it should be noticed
that AP requires that the choice of a deductive domain is made first. As
Proposition 2.9 shows, this in turn has an impact on the strength of the
principle itself. Hence, it must be made clear how much commitment one is
inclined to make in this sense. Levi has only made fairly general remarks on
the latter point. Apparently, he has considered the assumption that the set
R of real numbers be part of any chosen deductive domain to be a minimum
requirement for relevant parts of mathematics to make sense.
But he did not want to go too far beyond vague indications of this sort
either. In a review of one of Levi’s paper in Spanish [24],17 Quine [32]
criticizes Levi for having left obscure, among others, the notion of real
number, and in particular the one of deductive domain; and clearly this
is how one would react to a first reading of Levi’s description of these
notions as “primitive ideas” and “simple intuitions”. However, yet another
interpretation is possible, to which Quine perhaps subconsciously alleges
when lucidly stating at the end of his review [32]:
Constructivity, in general, is relative: a proof is constructive with
respect to a given domain when it can be carried out wholly therein.
In fact, Levi’s “primitive ideas” and “simple intuitions” can — and from
a contemporary perspective presumably should — be seen as “primitive”
and “simple” relative to the given context: as “black boxes” one takes for
granted and one does not want to specify any further, at least not for the
moment.
We are well aware that our view of Levi’s wording is somehow in conflict
with many a logician’s preference for absolute concepts, entirely based on
safe grounds, but our study of AP at work has brought us to believe that this
position would not do full justice to Levi’s work right at the forefront of early
modern mathematics. By the way, pursuing the suggested interpretation
helps to make sense of some remarks with which Levi relates AP to the
debate on the foundations of mathematics. He did not want to commit
himself to one or another of the parties involved therein, insofar as they
may influence the choice of deductive domains. Quite on the contrary, he
wished to present AP as an useful tool in order to clarify what disagreements
from this debate amounted to in the end.
All this seems to be the meaning of what he wrote in [22, pp. 166–167] to
Hilbert (emphasis is ours):
For the school of mathematicians that we may call finitist, the only
admissible deductive domain is the one which contains just one set:
the set of integers: certainly it would not be possible to speak of
“any real number whatsoever”, as this would amount to conceive an
arbitrarily given collection of fractions approximating a real number
(a necessarily infinite collection). In this deductive domain one will
17For the time being we have not got hold of this paper, which Levi has written during his
exile in Argentina. The title of it suggests that it may consist of a Spanish translation of [23].
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not be able to speak of anything but particular real numbers, each
of which is defined by assigning to it an approximation procedure
by rationals. And, it is neither this nor any other, similar conclusion
that keeps me off from mathematicians of this sort, but their exclusive
consideration of the deductive domain to which they would like to restrict
mathematical analysis.
This somewhat pragmatic approach to deductive domains was maybe
the one that Levi favored, and more traces can be found elsewhere in his
writings. For instance, Levi mentions in [23, pp. 73–74] two problems which
he thought to be at the basis of an axiom-oriented research on deductive
domains. The two problems in question are:
1. Given a set of mathematical statements, to determine the most
restricted deductive domain which makes them provable.
2. Given a deductive domain, to determine the set of statements which
are made provable by it.
Apart from resemblances to theFriedman–Simpsonprogrammeof reverse
mathematics [43], this may be seen as a reformulation of the soundness
and completeness problem in formal logic, with deductive domains play-
ing the role of model-like structures. Our way of understanding deductive
domains, however, equally justifies an approach which looks at them as
inner-mathematical objects, as has been done with related constructions in
metamathematics, e.g., with toposes as universes in the context of construc-
tive mathematics. This suggests to try to develop the present contribution in
the direction of formal axiomatics.
Moreover this quite naturally prompts us to consider an aspect which is
more relevant for the technical side of Levi’s proposal. In the application of
APwehave considered here, it is hard to avoid a certain feeling of artificiality,
or ad-hocness, in the strategy that is used. Part of this feeling goes back to
what we have just said: one has to choose a certain deductive domain first.
Of course, this must be done conveniently, namely it must be such that
the desired result follows. Now, should this choice not be considered as
part of the foundational purpose, that is, as part of the attempt of making
more acceptable a result for which a disputable choice principle is used?
Note that, by definition, the choice of a deductive domain encapsulates an
assumption concerning what collections of mathematical objects one is free
to pick elements from. Hence it can well be the case that this choice of
a deductive domain turns out to be as disputable as the choice principle
one is struggling with. The “singleton trick” we have used in the proof of
Proposition 2.9 shows that one should also carefully consider the specific
features of Levi’s principle in this respect.
There is another possible criticism going in the same direction. As amatter
of fact, the choice of the deductive domain is not the only one uponwhich the
final result may depend: in addition one has to set up the distance function
d . Here too it is required to find a reasonable balance between defining d
conveniently, in such a way that the desired result obtains, and by doing it
naturally with respect to the mathematical setting one is working within.
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Levi was aware of this issue (see [21, p. 320], for instance), and admitted
that it would point to a certain “arbitrariness” in the application of AP.
He nonetheless defended his principle by stressing that the “natural rule” is
that the function d “should be chosen in such a way to be convenient for the
problem to be treated” (emphasis is our).
Now, the application of AP to problems in the theory of metric spaces,
as those we have considered in Section 3, allows to put this criticism in a
stronger form, for there a metric is already given. As we said, the feature
of a distance function exceeds the properties of metrics as these are usually
defined in some respects. However, one cannot resist the temptation that,
at least in these cases, the choice of d should be somehow connected to the
mathematical objectunder scrutiny.Again, Levi could reply that the function
d required for the purpose of applying AP must be chosen according to the
choice of the deductive domain, which in turn must rather suit for the
mathematical problem one is dealing with.
If not as a criticism of Levi’s proposal, this at least poses a problem
to ponder for any future investigations about AP: Is there a significant
application of AP, possibly in the realm of metric spaces, which is natural in
the sense that it holds true with respect to nonartificial, or ad hoc choices of
the deductive domain and the distance function d ?
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